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TORTS-WRONGFuL DEATH: A VIABLE FETUS IS NOT A "PERSON" UNDER
THE ARKANSAS WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE. CHATELAIN V. KELLEY, 322

Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d 215 (1995).
I. INTRODUCTION

In Chatelain v. Kelley,' the Supreme Court of Arkansas considered
whether a cause of action could be brought for the death of a fetus under the
Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute.2 The court, in resolving this issue,
questioned whether the death of a fetus is the "death of a person" in the law
of wrongful death.' Until this decision, Arkansas remained one of only a
few states that had not decided whether a cause of action existed for the
wrongful death of a fetus.4 Although the court had previous occasion to
address the issue of whether a fetus is a person,5 Chatelain offered the court
its first6 opportunity to interpret the term person in the wrongful death
statute.
This case began when the parents of a stillborn baby brought a
wrongful death action against the delivering physician.7 The trial court
granted the physician's motion for summary judgment upon finding that an
unborn fetus is not a person under the Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute

1. 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d 215 (1995).
2. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995). The relevant portion
of the statute provides:
(a)(1) Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect,
or default and the act, neglect, or default is such as would have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, if death had
not ensued, then, and in every such case, the person who, or company, or
corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable
to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and
although the death may have been caused under circumstances as amount in law
to a felony.
(2) The cause of action created in this subsection shall survive the death of the
person wrongfully causing the death of another and may be brought, maintained,
or revived against the personal representative of the person wrongfully causing the
death of another.
Id.
3. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 518, 910 S.W.2d at 216.
4. See Barbara E. Lingle, Comment, Allowing Fetal Wrongful Death Actions In
Arkansas: A Death Whose Time Has Come?, 44 ARK. L. REv. 465 (1991).
5. Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987) (holding that a fetus is not
a person under the manslaughter statute); Carpenter v. Bishop, 290 Ark. 424, 720 S.W.2d 299
(1986) (holding that the doctrine of parental immunity barred suit against mother for
negligent death of her fetus); Carpenter v. Logan, 281 Ark. 184, 662 S.W.2d 808 (1984)
(holding that a fetus is not a "deceased person" within meaning of probate code).
6. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 518, 910 S.W.2d at 216.
7. Id. at 518, 910 S.W.2d at 215.
8. Id.
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The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.9 By
holding that a fetus is not a person for purposes of the wrongful death
statute, the court implicitly rejected the position held by an overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions that allows recovery." Instead, the court joined a
small minority of jurisdictions."
This note briefly reviews the historical development of fetal wrongful
death actions. It then examines the major differences between the majority
view and the minority view on issues within the law of fetal wrongful death
actions. Next, it analyzes the court's reasoning in Chatelain. Finally, the
note considers the significance of the decision.

II.

FACTS

On June 26, 1989, Joanne Mote, now Joanne Chatelain, 2 entered the
Bull Shoals Community hospital for the expected delivery of her baby. 3
During the delivery, her physician, Dr. Lawrence A. Kelley, performed an
emergency Cesarean section;' 4 eighteen hours after Joanne was admitted to
the hospital, she delivered a stillborn baby.' 5
The Motes brought a wrongful death action against Dr. Kelley and the
hospital, alleging that Baby Eugene 6 was stillborn because Dr. Kelley
negligently delayed the Cesarean section." The Motes voluntarily dismissed
the claim against the hospital in 1992 and refiled the complaint against Dr.
Kelley.' In addition to punitive damages, they sought recovery for their
mental anguish. 9 Dr. Kelley denied that he was negligent and argued that
the stillborn fetus was not a "person" within the meaning of the wrongful
death statute.2" In 1993, the trial court granted Dr. Kelley's motion for
summary judgment and concluded that an unborn fetus was not a person
under Arkansas's Wrongful Death Statute.2' The Motes appealed the
9. Id.
10. See majority jurisdiction cases cited infra note 44.
11. See minority jurisdiction cases cited infra note 45.
12. Brief for Appellee at 4, Chatelain v. Kelley, 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d 215 (1995)
(No. 95-450).
13. Id.
14. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 517, 910 S.W.2d at 215.
15. Reply Brief for Appellants at 2, Chatelain v. Kelley, 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d 215
(1995) (No. 95-450).
16. Id.
17. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 518, 910 S.W.2d at 215.
18. Id.

19. Appellee's Brief at 4, Chatelain (No. 95-450).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 5.
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decision to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial court's
order granting Dr. Kelley's motion for summary judgment. The court held
that an unborn fetus was not a person under the statute.22
III. BACKGROUND
The right to bring an action for the wrongful death of a fetus arising
from injuries received en ventre sa mere 3 developed gradually over more
than a century. The common law traditionally denied recovery for prenatal
or fetal injuries or deaths caused by tortious conduct. 24 Eventually, the
courts recognized a common law action for tortiously inflicted prenatal
injuries, if the fetus survived birth.25 Similarly, the wrongful death statutes
afforded a remedy if the prenatal injuries resulted in death after a live
birth. 26 The controversial aspect of this area of tort law involves the right
to recover for the wrongful death of an unborn fetus. Courts allowing such
recovery have either recognized a new common-law cause of action or, more
often, interpreted the applicable wrongful death statutes to include an action
for the death of an unborn fetus.27
A. Historical Development of Fetal Wrongful Death Actions
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton,2' decided in 1884, is the first
recorded American case that addressed the issue of tort liability for prenatal
injuries. In Dietrich, a woman in her fourth or fifth month of pregnancy
slipped and fell on a highway maintained by the defendant.29 She suffered
a miscarriage as a result of the fall.3" The administrator of the child's estate
brought an action against the defendant for negligence. 3' In an opinion
written by Justice Holmes, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that an action for prenatal injuries would not lie based on the theory that the

22. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 525, 901 S.W.2d at 219.
23. This term means "in its mother's womb." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (6th ed.
1990).

24.
367-68
25.
26.
27.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER-AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§

55, at

(5th ed. 1984).
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, § 55, at 368.
Lingle, supra note 4, at 488 & n.122.

28. 138 Mass. 14 (1884), overruled by, Torigan v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d
926 (Mass. 1967).

29. Id.
30. Id. at 14-15.
31. Id.

310
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unborn child was essentially a part of its mother and not a separate being.32
Justice Holmes noted the lack of precedent for civil liability in tort "to one
not yet inbeing. 3 a Courts followed Dietrich's enunciation of the common
law rule for more than sixty years and set forth several reasons to justify the
rule against recovery: lack of precedent, stare decisis, lack of duty to the
fetus, difficulty in proof, and fear of fraudulent claims.'
In 1946, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
in Bonbrest v. Kotz,35 rejected the common law rule and permitted a
surviving child to bring a cause of action for prenatal injuries sustained
while viable.36 Bonbrest involved a claim brought by an infant through its
father and next friend to recover for injuries it sustained when negligently
removed from its mother's womb.37 The court distinguished Bonbrest from
Dietrich on the grounds that the infant in Bonbrest survived a direct injury,
which was inflicted when the infant was viable.38 Moreover, the court
expressly rejected the view that a viable fetus was only a part of its mother
and not a separate being.39
Bonbrest established the rule that a viable fetus, injured in the womb,
may recover for prenatal injuries if it survived birth. Every jurisdiction now
permits recovery for prenatal injuries if the child is born alive; and if the
child dies after birth, a claim may be brought for wrongful death.' °
32. Id. at 17. Justice Holmes explained:
[A]s the unborn child was part of the mother at the time of injury, any damage
to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by her,
we think it clear that the statute sued upon does not embrace the plaintiff's
intestate within its meaning ....
Id.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Thomas L. Wenger, Comment, Developments In The Law of Prenatal Wrongful
Death, 69 DICKINSON L. REv. 258, 259 (1965).
35. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
36. Id. at 139. The term "viable" in reference to a child means "capable of independent
existence outside his or her mother's womb." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed.
1990).
37. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 139.
38. Id. at 140.
39. Id. The court observed:
As to a viable child being "part" of its mother---this argument seems to me to be
a contradiction in terms. True, it is in the womb, but it is capable now of extrauterine life--and while dependent for its continued development on sustenance
derived from its peculiar relationship to its mother, it is not a "part" of the mother
in the sense of a constituent element--as that term is generally understood.
Modem medicine is replete with cases of living children being taken from dead
mothers. Indeed, apart from viability, a non-viable foetus is not a part of its
mother.
Id.
40. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, § 55, at 368. Arkansas has not decided this issue,
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The most significant development in the law of fetal wrongful death
occurred three years after Bonbrest. In 1949, the Minnesota Supreme Court

became the first jurisdiction to recognize a cause of action for the wrongful
death of a stillborn fetus.' In Verkennes v. Corniea, both the mother and
fetus died during labor, allegedly due to the negligence of the surgeon and
hospital. 42 The court held that where prenatal injuries result in stillbirth of
a viable fetus, an action may be brought under the state's wrongful death
43
statute.
The Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Verkennes marked the
beginning of a trend in state courts to allow recovery for the wrongful death
of a fetus. Today, the substantial weight of authority favors allowing
recovery under the wrongful death statutes for the death of a viable fetus."
but Justice Glaze stated that Prosser's statement appeared to be consistent with Arkansas
statutory law. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 526, 901 S.W.2d at 220 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
41. Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
42. Id. at 839.
43. Id. at 840. The court reasoned: "It seems too plain for argument that where
independent existence is possible and life is destroyed through a wrongful act a cause of
action arises under the statutes cited." Id. at 841.
44. Jurisdictions recognizing fetal wrongful death actions include: Colorado, Espadero
v. Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Colo. 1986) (applying Colorado law) (viable fetus); District
of Columbia, Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971) (viable fetus);
Alabama, Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974) (eight and one-half
month old fetus); Arizona, Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985) (viable
fetus); Connecticut, Gorke v. Le Clerc, 181 A.2d 448 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962) (viable fetus);
Delaware, Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956) (viable
fetus); Georgia, Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955) (quick child) (stating
that a quick child is "one that has developed so that it moves within the mother's womb."
BLACKS'S LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (6th ed. 1990)); Idaho, Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11
(Idaho 1982) (viable fetus); Illinois, Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88 (Ill.
1973) (viable fetus); Indiana, Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971) (full-term
child); Kansas, Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962) (viable fetus); Kentucky, Mitchell
v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955) (viable fetus); Louisiana, Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So.
2d 633 (La. 1981) (six month old fetus); Maryland, State ex rel Odham v. Sherman, 198
A.2d 71 (Md. 1964) (viable fetus); Massachusetts, Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331
N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975) (viable fetus); Michigan, O'Neill v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785 (Mich.
1971) (viable fetus); Minnesota, Verkennes v. Comiea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949) (viable
fetus); Mississippi, Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1954) (viable fetus); Missouri,
O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (viable fetus); Nevada, White v. Yup, 458
P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969) (viable fetus); New Hampshire, Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249
(N.H. 1957) (viable fetus); New Mexico, Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 619 P.2d 826 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1980) (viable fetus); North Carolina, DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C.
1987) (viable fetus); North Dakota, Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984)
(viable fetus); Ohio, Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985) (viable fetus);
Oklahoma, Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976) (viable fetus); Oregon, Libbee v.
Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636 (Or. 1974) (viable fetus); Pennsylvania, Amadio v. Levin,
501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985) (viable fetus); Rhode Island, Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d
748 (R.I. 1976) (nonviable fetus); South Carolina, Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C.
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However, a respectable minority of jurisdictions continue to adhere to the
live birth requirement and deny recovery for the wrongful death of a
stillborn fetus.45
B. Key Issues in the Law of Fetal Wrongful Death
Courts traditionally address several legal and policy issues when
deciding whether to allow a cause of action for the death of a fetus under
the wrongful death statutes. This note will discuss four of these issues: (1)
whether the fetus is a person under the applicable wrongful death statutes;
(2) the effect of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Roe v.
Wade;46 (3) whether to draw the line of recovery at live birth or viability;
and (4) whether concerns about proof of causation and damages justify
denying recovery. The majority and minority jurisdictions offer compelling
arguments on each side of these issues.

1964) (viable fetus); South Dakota, Farley v. Mount Marty Hosp. Ass'n, 387 N.W.2d 42
(S.D. 1986) (viable fetus); Utah, Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975) (viable
fetus); Vermont, Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980) (viable fetus);
Washington, Moen v. Hanson, 537 P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975) (viable fetus); West Virginia,
Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971) (viable fetus); Wisconsin, Kwaterski v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967). Illinois and South Dakota
have enacted legislation addressing a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus, in
addition to judicial decisions. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/2.2 (West 1993); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (Michie 1987). Tennessee has enacted legislation to provide a
cause of action. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1994).
45. Alaska, Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962) (applying Alaska law)
(recovery denied for nonviable four to four and one-half month old fetus); California, Justus
v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977); Florida, Duncan v. Flynn, 342 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977); Iowa, Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981); Maine, Milton v. Cary
Med. Ctr., 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988); Montana, Kuhnke v. Fisher, 683 P.2d 916 (Mont.
1984); Nebraska, Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp. Inc., 387 N.W. 2d 490 (Neb. 1986);
New Jersey, Graf v. Taggert, 204 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1964); New York, Endresz v. Friedberg,
248 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969); Texas, Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d
503 (Tex. 1987); Virginia, Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1969). Hawaii
and Wyoming have yet to decide whether to allow the cause of action.
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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The Fetus as a "Person" Under Wrongful Death Statutes:
TraditionalAnalysis

The right to recover damages for wrongful death is purely statutory.47
Therefore, a plaintiffs ability to recover for the wrongful death of a fetus
depends upon the language of the statute and its construction by the court.4"
Under the provisions of most wrongful death statutes, the right to bring an
action is conditioned on the death of a "person" who, if death had not
ensued, could have maintained an action for damages. 49 Thus, courts face
the initial task of determining whether a fetus is a "person" under the
applicable wrongful death statute.
Many courts examine the intent or purpose of the legislature in creating
the cause of action as a basis for interpreting the meaning of the term
"person." 50 However, legislative intent provides courts with only minimal
assistance because it is likely that most legislatures never considered
whether a fetus was to be included within the term "person" when the
wrongful death statutes were enacted." Some courts conclude that a fetus
47. Under the common law, the death of an injured tort victim terminated any existing
cause of action for the injury as well as any new and independent cause of action in the
victim's dependents or heirs. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, § 127, at 945. In 1846,
England changed the common law rule by passing Lord Campbell's Act. KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 24, § 127, at 945. All states have modified the common law by enacting
wrongful death statutes, most of which are modeled after Lord Campbell's Act. KEETON ET
AL., supra note 24, § 127, at 945-46. The majority of these statutes are death acts, which
establish a new cause of action for the decedent's personal representatives or beneficiaries.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, § 127, at 946. A minority of statutes are survival acts, which
preserve the cause of action vested in the decedent at the moment of death. KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 24, § 127, at 946. The principal difference between the two types of statutes is
the elements of damages that are recoverable. KEETON ET AL, supra note 24, § 127, at 946.
For a general discussion of wrongful death statutes and claims, see STUART M. SPEISER ET
AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY (3d ed. 1992).
48. MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 26.02, at 26-3 (1987).
49. Id. For the text of the various states' wrongful death statutes, see SPEISER ET AL,
supra note 47, at app. A.
50. E.g., O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983); Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d
122 (Cal. 1977); Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987).
51. See Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985):
In our view, it is most likely that the legislature never adverted to the fetus/person
issue when it passed Arizona's first wrongful death statute.... The solution to
this problem cannot be found in a methodology which requires us to assume or
divine a legislative intent on an issue which most probably was never considered.
Id. at 720. See also, Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107, 111
(Wis. 1967). ("The argument that the legislature never intended that such wrongful death
actions apply to stillborn infants is also not valid. This law was passed in 1857 and little
was known at that time concerning the life of an infant in the womb."); David Kader, The
Law of Tortious PrenatalDeath Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REv. 639, 647-49 (1980)
(explaining the various court interpretations of legislative intent).
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is not a "person" on the basis of the common law interpretation of the term.
Because the common law did not consider a fetus as a person, the courts
infer that legislatures did not intend to include fetuses within the meaning
of the term. 2
In the absence of clear legislative intent on the issue, courts in the
majority validate the action by proposing that construing the wrongful death
statute to include fetuses effectuates the purposes of the statutes.53 Virtually
all courts that allow recovery note that wrongful death statutes are remedial
in nature and purpose and, therefore, should be liberally construed to
accomplish their objective of providing a cause of action against one whose
tortious conduct caused the death of another.' Courts in the minority
recognize the remedial nature of the wrongful death statutes but are
unwilling to construe the term "person" to include fetuses absent specific
statutory intent.55
Another source of authority courts cite when deciding whether a fetus
is a "person" is the knowledge and attitudes of the medical community
toward a fetus. 6 Modem medical attitudes view the fetus as a "separate
though dependent entity from the moment of conception."5 " In Mitchell v.
Couch, 8 the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that the most convincing
reason for holding that a viable fetus is an entity within the general
understanding of the term "person" is because it has a biological existence
52. E.g., Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 271 (Iowa 1981) (noting that an unborn fetus
was not generally. considered a "person" at common law); Smith v. Columbus Community
Hosp., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Neb. 1986) (stating that in light of the common law rule
that an unborn fetus was not a person in the law of torts, the legislature would have clearly
stated its intention to create an action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus if it so
intended); Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139, 143 (N.J. 1988) (commenting that when the
wrongful death act was enacted a fetus was not considered a "person" in a "legal or juridical
sense" and that it is inferable that the legislature adopted the common law understanding of
the concept of a "person" when it enacted the act).
53. E.g., Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d
904 (Mo. 1983); Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984); Amadio v. Levin, 501
A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985); Farley v. Mount Marty Hosp. Ass'n, 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1986).
54. E.g., O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983); Hopkins v. McBane, 359
N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984); Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980).
55. E.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977). "[W]e do not join those courts
which have equated fetus with person simply because the wrongful death statute is 'remedial'
and must be 'liberally' construed .... When the intent of that body [legislature] is clear..
. there is no room for construction, liberal or otherwise." Id. at 132. The same view was
expressed in Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987).
"[A]lthough our wrongful death statute is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed,
we may not rewrite the statute in the guise of construing it." Id. at 504.
56. Tyler J. Scofield, Note, Recovery for Tortious Death of the Unborn, 33 S.C. L. REv.
797, 802-03 (1982).
57. Id. at 802.
58. 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).
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as a human being.5 9 However, courts holding that the term "person" does not
include fetuses carefully limit the interpretation of the word to the context
of wrongful death.6 °
Courts also look to the legal status of the unborn in other areas of the
law for guidance in interpreting the term.6' Courts in the majority note that
a guardian ad litem may be appointed for the unborn, 62 the unborn may
inherit property,6 3 the unborn are protected under the criminal law,6' and the
unborn are specifically included as "decedents" in the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act.65 Thus, some courts conclude that a viable fetus should be
accorded legal status and protection under the wrongful death statute."
Courts in the minority recognize the legal status accorded the unborn
in other areas of the law, but contend that the rights of the unborn in the
other areas only vest when the child is born alive.67 These courts argue that
the treatment of the unborn in other areas of the law further illustrates the

59. The court stated that "biologically speaking, such a child is, in fact, a presently
existing person, a living human being." Id. at 905. See also White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617,
622 (Nev. 1969) (stating that a commonly advanced reason by courts for allowing recovery
is that a viable child is, biologically, a presently existing person and a living human being
capable of existence outside the female body, as well as within).
60. E.g., Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 273 (Iowa 1981) (admonishing that it
expresses no opinion regarding the existence of a fetus as a person biologically, religiously,
or philosophically); Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Neb.
1986) (expressing no opinion with respect to the existence of the fetus as a person in the
philosophical or scientific sense).
61. Scofield, supra note 56, at 800-01.
62. E.g., O'Neill v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1971); Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d
11 (Idaho 1982).
63. E.g., Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982); Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr.
Hosp., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980). See William J. Maledon, Note, The Law and the Unborn
Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NoTRE DAME LAw. 349, 351-54 (1971)
(noting that the law of property recognizes the rights of the unborn from the moment of
conception).
64. E.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985); see also Maledon,
supra note 63, at 362-69.
65. E.g., Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982); Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr.
Hosp., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980).
66. The court in Bonbrest v. Kotz questioned, "Why a 'part' of the mother under the law
of negligence and a separate entity and person in that of property and crime?" Bonbrest v.
Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946).
67. E.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 131 (Cal. 1977) (noting that the property
rights of the unborn prescribed in the civil code do not vest until the child is born alive);
Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 904 (N.Y. 1969) (pointing out that although an unborn
child has certain property rights, the enjoyment of those rights is dependent upon being born
alive).
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legislative ability to use appropriate language to included fetuses when the
legislature so intends.6 8
2. The Fetus as a Person Under the Wrongful Death Statutes: The
Effect of Roe v. Wade
In Roe v. Wade,69 the United States Supreme Court held, among other
things, that an unborn fetus is not a "person" under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.7" The Court acknowledged
that an unborn fetus has been afforded legal status in some areas of the law,
but concluded that the "unborn have never been recognized in the law as
persons in the whole sense."7 However, the Court also recognized viability
as the "'compelling' point" in a state's "important and legitimate interest"
of protecting potential life.72
Most courts deciding fetal wrongful death cases after Roe either have
ignored the decision or distinguished it.73 When the majority position cites
Roe, it is usually for the proposition that Roe supports recovery for a viable
fetus because the Supreme Court recognized that a state has a compelling
interest in protecting fetal life at viability.74 In addition, the majority argues
that the Supreme Court's holding in Roe, that a fetus is not a "person" under
the Fourteenth Amendment, is not conclusive on the issue of whether a fetus
is a "person" under the wrongful death statutes.75
68. Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 132 (Cal. 1977) ("When the legislature determines
to confer legal personality on unborn fetuses for certain limited purposes, it expresses that
intent in specific and appropriate terms; the corollary, of course, is that when the legislature
speaks generally of a 'person' ... it impliedly but plainly excludes such fetuses.").
69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
70. Id. at 158.
71. Id. at 162.
72. Id. at 163.
73. MINZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 26-6 & n.16. See Kader, supra note 51, for an
excellent discussion of the effect of Roe on fetal wrongful death actions. Professor Kader
identified three ways that courts have used Roe. First, courts have employed Roe in support
of the argument that a fetus is not a person. Kader, supra note 51, at 656-58. Second, Roe
has been used in an effort to limit recovery to a viable fetus because that is when the state's
interest in prenatal life becomes "compelling." Kader, supra note 51, at 658-60. Third,
courts have used Roe in an effort to expand recovery on the premise that the state has an
interest in protecting prenatal life. Kader, supra note 51, at 660-62.
74. MINZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 26-6. See Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So.
2d 354 (Ala. 1974); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985); O'Grady v.
Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636 (Or.

1974).
75. MINZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 26-6. E.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698
P.2d 712, 723 (Ariz. 1985) (concluding that Roe "'neither prohibits nor compels' the
inclusion of a fetus as a person for the purposes of other enactments"); O'Grady v. Brown,
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Only a few courts have cited Roe in support of the position that there
should be no recovery for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. 76 These
courts cited Roe for the proposition that a fetus is not a "person., 77 Overall,
it seems that Roe's influence on fetal wrongful death claims has been
slight.78
3. The Line of Demarcation: Viability versus Live Birth
The most fundamental issue concerning recovery for the wrongful death
of a fetus is whether the fetus must be born alive in order to maintain an
action for prenatal injuries that subsequently result in death. Bonbrest v.
Kotz79 established the rule that there must be a live birth in order to
recover.80 Verkennes v. Corniea8 1 went one step further to allow recovery
for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus.8 2 The overwhelming weight of
authority follows Verkennes and supports recovery for the negligently caused
death of an unborn, viable fetus.8 3 However, a minority of jurisdictions
continue to require live birth as a prerequisite for recovery."
Courts adopting the majority view advance several reasons in support
of the viability standard. First, viability is the point at which a fetus
becomes a "person" within the meaning of wrongful death statutes.8 5
Second, viability is a more logical point at which to draw recovery than live
birth.86 An often cited example of the illogical and inconsistent result
654 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Mo. 1983) (stating that Roe "does not mandate the conclusion that the
fetus is a legal nonentity").
76. Justus v Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa
1981). See Kader, supra note 51, at 656 n.91 for additional cases. Note, however, that
several of these jurisdictions now allow recovery. Arizona, Missouri, and Tennessee now
allow recovery. See also supra note 44.
77. Justus, 565 P.2d at 131 (noting that the Roe Court held that the word "person" in
the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the unborn); Weilt, 311 N.W.2d at 271 (citing
Roe in support of the statement that a fetus was not considered a "person" at common law).
78. MINZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 26-6.
79. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
80. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
81. 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
82. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
83. See supra note 44.
84. See supra note 45.
85. E.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92 (Ill. 1973) (recognizing
viability as the stage at which a child becomes a "person" within the wrongful death statute);
Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434, 439 (Miss. 1954) (stating that a viable child is entitled to
protection of its person).
86. E.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354, 357 (Ala. 1974) (arguing that
it is illogical to allow liability to depend on whether death from fatal injury occurs before
or after live birth); Sunmerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 722 (Ariz. 1985) (stating
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created by the live birth rule is the hypothetical situation proposed by the
Ohio Court of Appeals in Stidam v. Ashmore.87 The court offered the
example of viable twins simultaneously suffering the same prenatal injury
from which one died before birth and the other after birth.88 The court
concluded that logic dictates the recognition of causes of action for both or
for neither. 89 A final reason courts advance in support of the viability
standard is that denying recovery in instances where death results before
birth rewards the tortfeasor for more severe negligent acts."
Courts in the minority, which follow the common law rule and require
live birth, counter with several arguments against the viability standard.
First, the minority maintains that a child must be born alive in order to be
a "person" under the wrongful death statutes.9' The Restatement 2d of Torts
supports this position. 92 Second, the minority argues that the justifications
for allowing recovery where the child survives do not exist for the
stillborn.93 Finally, the minority proposes that live birth is a more appropriate place to draw the line for recovery than viability.'
that viability is a less arbitrary and more logical point at which to recognize loss to the
survivors than the moment of birth); Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ohio 1985)
(proposing that it is illogical and unjust to deny an action where the child is stillborn and,
yet, permit the action where the child survives birth for only a few moments).
87. 167 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
88. Id. at 108.
89. Id.
90. E.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974); Danos v. St. Pierre,
402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981); Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980);
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967).
91. E.g., Duncan v. Flynn, 342 So. 2d 123, 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (citing a prior
decision where it held that "a child injured before birth, once born alive is a 'person' under
the Constitution of the United States and the State of Florida").
92. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
(1) One who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to
the child for the harm if the child is born alive.
(2) If the child is not born alive, there is no liability unless the applicable
wrongful death statute so provides.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1979).
93. Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969). The court stated:
The considerations of justice which mandate the recovery of damages by an
infant, injured in his mother's womb and born deformed through the wrong of a
third party, are absent where the foetus, deprived of life while yet unborn, is
never faced with the prospect of impaired mental or physical health.
Id. at 903.
94. E.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 134 (Cal. 1977) (concluding that the
distinction drawn between the born and unborn is not arbitrary, but bears a rational
relationship to the legislative goal of placing reasonable limits on wrongful death actions);
Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905 (N.Y. 1969) (stating that difficulties are always
present where a line must be drawn, but live birth is a more appropriate place to draw the
line). See also, Wenger, supra note 34, at 268 (arguing that live birth is a less arbitrary
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4. Proof of Causation and Proof of Damages
A final issue courts consider in deciding whether to allow fetal
wrongful death actions involves public policy relating to proof of causation
and damages. Courts in the majority argue that potential problems in
proving causation or in assessing damages should not operate to completely
bar the action.95 The majority maintains that proving causation and damages
is no less difficult in the wrongful death action of a child who is born alive
and lives only a few moments than in the case of an unborn fetus, yet all
jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for the former.9 6 Finally, the
majority rejects the idea that allowing a wrongful death action for a viable
stillborn fetus would permit double recovery for those bringing the action,
because the child is an entity in its own right.97
Difficulty in proving causation and assessing damages is a traditional
argument that minority courts utilize to deny recovery. These minority
courts assert that causation is difficult to prove in actions involving the
death of an unborn viable fetus and that damages are too speculative.9"
Furthermore, because some wrongful death statutes limit recovery to
pecuniary losses, 99 the minority submits that an unborn fetus lacks the ability
place to allow recovery than viability).
95. E.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354, 358 (Ala. 1974) (concluding
that substantive rights must be protected regardless of the difficulties of proof);
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. 1973); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924
(Okla. 1976); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985); Moen v. Hanson, 537 P.2d 266

(Wash. 1975).
96. E.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88, 90-91 (asserting that
difficulties in determining damages for the child who lives only momentarily after birth are
no greater or different in character from difficulties in the case of an injured child who did
not survive birth); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d
1085 (Pa. 1985).
97. E.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354, 358 (rejecting the double
recovery argument because there is an injury to two different persons); Amadio v. Levin, 501
A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1985) ; Moen v. Hanson, 537 P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975).
98. E.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903 (N.Y. 1969) (emphasizing that
proof of pecuniary injury and causation is decidedly more vague in suits for the unborn than
in a suit for a suiviving child's prenatal injuries). See also David A. Gordon, The Unborn
Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REv. 579 (1965) (arguing against the viability standard on damage
grounds).
99. Pecuniary loss includes losses that can be estimated in, and compensated by, money.
It includes the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the decedent, had he or she
lived. It also includes loss of care, love, and affection. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1131
(6th ed. 1990). Arkansas's wrongful death statute allows the beneficiaries of the action to
recover for the pecuniary injuries, including a "spouse's loss of the services and
companionship of a deceased spouse and mental anguish resulting from the death to the
ARK. CODE ANN.
surviving spouse and beneficiaries of the deceased person."
§ 16-62-102(2)(f)(1) (Supp. 1995). See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 47, at app. A, for the
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to incur pecuniary loss."' ° Finally, the minority courts contend that allowing
a cause of action for a viable fetus would result in double recovery in favor
of the estate or survivors because they may recover personal losses in
independent actions.'0 '
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In denying recovery for the death of Baby Eugene under the Arkansas
Wrongful Death Statute, the Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected the
majority position which holds that a fetus's death qualifies as the death of
a person for the purposes of wrongful death. Implicit in the opinion is the
assertion that a viable fetus, injured prenatally, may recover for its injuries
only if it is born alive. 2 Before making its ruling, the court examined the
rationale expressed by the majority and minority courts.
The court began its analysis by discussing the majority view, citing
The
Summerfield v. Superior Court0 3 as typical of the majority."°
Summerfield court concluded that there is an illogical distinction between
recognizing a wrongful death action for a prenatal injury that results in the
death of a child born alive and denying the cause of action when the
prenatal injury causes the death of a viable fetus.'0 5 In addition, the
various states' wrongful death statutes, including recoverable damages.
100. E.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 133 (Cal. 1977) (reasoning that a fetus is not
a wage-earner and that its death causes no appreciable economic loss to its survivors); Graf
v. Taggert, 204 A.2d 140, 143-44 (N.J. 1964) (noting that New Jersey limited damages to
pecuniary loss; in absence of pecuniary loss the action will not lie and an unborn's pecuniary
loss would be virtually impossible to predict); Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905
(stating that liability for damages caused by wrong ceases at a point dictated by public policy
or common sense). See also FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 18.3 at 679
(2d ed. 1986) (arguing that the estate or survivors of the unborn child have a more tenuous
and doubtful claim to pecuniary compensation than a child who survives prenatal injuries).
101. Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905 (holding that damages recoverable by
the parents for their loss in their own action adequately redresses the wrong).
102. Chatelain v. Kelley, 322 Ark. 517, 526, 910 S.W.2d 215, 219-20 (1995) (Glaze, J.,
dissenting). Justice Glaze noted that Arkansas has yet to rule that a tort action can be
brought to recover damages for prenatal injuries if the injured child is born alive. He stated,
"while the majority opinion appears to recognize that a prenatal-injured, viable fetus may
have a cause of action for negligence if the fetus is born alive, no such action exists if the
fetus is stillborn." Id. at 526, 910 S.W.2d at 220 (Glaze; J., dissenting).
103. 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985).
104. Chatelain, 321 Ark. at 519, 910 S.W.2d at 216.
105. Id. The court stated:
The Arizona Court pointed out that the law clearly would allow a cause of action
for a prenatal injury resulting in the death of a child born alive, and it is thus
illogical to say that a prenatal injury resulting in the death of a viable fetus should
not form the basis of a wrongful death claim.
Id. (citing Summerfield).
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Arkansas court noted that the Summerfield court decided viability is a less
arbitrary and more logical point to recognize a loss to survivors.10 6 Finally,
the court observed what it described as a "common thread" in the majority
cases; namely, the recognition that a wrongful death suit is a remedial
device and that courts afford wrongful death statutes liberal interpretations
07
to accomplish the dual purposes of compensation and deterrence.
The court conducted a more detailed review of the minority approach
08
by focusing on four issues. First, it discussed the live birth requirement,1
citing Duncan v. Flynn" to support the position that there must be a live
birth to maintain an action for prenatal injuries under a wrongful death
statute."0 Second, the court examined how some minority courts consider
the fetus's treatment in other legislation."' Specifically, the court cited
Giardinav. Bennett,2 which noted the legislature's ability to distinguish
between persons and fetuses in the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act." 3
Third, the court reviewed the minority's position on the issue of
statutory construction of the term "person.""' 4 The court pointed to an Iowa
decision, Weitl v. Moes, 1' that held a "person" is one who has achieved an
individual identity through birth." 6 Furthermore, the court noted that the
Weiti court emphasized that Iowa's wrongful death statute was the "survival
type." ' 7 The court observed that
Arkansas's Wrongful Death Statute is also
8
a "survival" type of statute."

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 519, 910 S.W.2d at 216.
109. 342 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
110. Id.
111. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 519-20, 910 S.W.2d at 216.
112. 545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988).
113. Id.
114. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 520, 910 S.W.2d at 216-17.
115. 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981).
116. Id. "The Iowa Court observed that a 'person' is a human being who has 'attained
a recognized individual identity' by being born alive." Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 520, 910
S.W.2d at 216-17.
117. Id. at 520, 910 S.W.2d at 217. The court quoted the following language from Weiti:
Such a statute does not create a new cause of action in the decedent's survivors;
rather, it preserves whatever rights and liabilities a decedent had with respect to
a cause of action at the time of his death. The cause of action thus preserved is
deemed to accrue to the decedent's estate representative 'at the time it would have
accrued to the deceased if he had survived.'
Id. (quoting Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d at 270 (Iowa 1981) (citations omitted)).
118. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 520, 910 S.W.2d at 217. See supra note 2 for the relevant
text of Arkansas's Wrongful Death Statute.
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Fourth, and finally, the court discussed minority courts' concerns for
a fetus's measurement of recovery." 9 The court cited cases voicing concern
over the speculative nature of proving causation and assessing damages in
cases involving the wrongful death of a stillborn. 2 These cases decided
that the live birth rule presented a more appropriate place to draw the line
for recovery.'
After completing its review of the majority and minority approaches,
the court commented on the difficult nature of the decision that lay before
it.' 22 Then, the court discussed the three prior cases that afforded an
opportunity to consider the issue of whether a fetus is a "person."' 2 3 First,
the court reviewed its holding in Carpenter v. Logan. 24 Carpenter
determined that an unborn fetus could not be considered a decedent under
the probate code.'25 In Carpenterv. Bishop, 126 the court failed to reach the
issue of whether a stillborn127 fetus is a "person" because the suit was
dismissed on other grounds.
Finally, the court discussed Meadows v. State128 where it held that the
term "person" did not include a fetus under the manslaughter law.' 29 The
Meadows opinion held that the term "person" is defined by common law,
and at common law a fetus was not included in the definition of the terms
"human being" and "person."'. 0 Moreover, in Meadows, the court was
persuaded that the repeal of an early feticide statute displayed the legislative
intent that killing a viable fetus was not manslaughter. 3 ' The court
119. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 521, 910 S.W.2d at 217.
120. Id. (citing Graf v. Taggert, 204 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 248
N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969)).
121. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 521, 910 S.W.2d at 217.
122. Id. at 522, 910 S.W.2d at 217-18. "The combination of expressions of public
policy, logic, precedent, and legislative intent found in the cases of other states presents a
very difficult field to traverse. We find the crossing less difficult, however, when we add
decisions we have made on the periphery of the question presented." Id. See Lingle, supra
note 4, at 472-79 for a discussion of the court's reasoning in these cases.
123. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 522, 910 S.W.2d at 217-18.
124. Id. at 522, 910 S.W.2d at 218 (citing Carpenter v. Logan, 281 Ark. 184, 662 S.W.2d
808 (1984)).
125. Id. at 523, 910 S.W.2d at 218. "Nothing is said about unborn children in the
constitutional provision concerning probate courts or in the statutory jurisdictional provision.
Any attempt to extend the probate code to unborn children would be without specific
authority and would be void." Id. (quoting Carpenter v. Logan, 281 Ark. 184, 186, 662
S.W.2d 808, 810 (1984)).
126. 290 Ark. 424, 720 S.W.2d 299 (1986).
127. Id. The suit in Carpenter was barred by the doctrine of parental immunity. Id.
128. 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987).
129. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 524, 910 S.W.2d at 218.
130. Id. at 524, 910 S.W.2d at 218-19.
131. Id. "An early feticide statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2223 (Repl. 1964) provided that
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reasoned that the manslaughter statute's revision illustrated that the General
Assembly knew32 how to include language designed to protect or not to
protect fetuses.1
The court also considered Amendment 68 of the Arkansas Constitution
and its effect on the issue. 33 The state's public policy, as expressed in
Amendment 68, is to protect the life of every unborn child from conception
until birth to the fullest degree allowed under the Constitution."4 However,
the court reasoned that, if it were required by that Amendment to interpret
the wrongful death statute as protecting fetuses, a cause of action would

begin at conception. 135
Finally, the court stated that the decision to include a fetus in the
definition of "person" is a policy issue best left to the legislature. 36 The
court emphasized that the General Assembly failed to expand the definition
of the term in the probate law and in the manslaughter statute.' 37 Moreover,
the court was reluctant to hold that a fetus is a "person" under the wrongful
13
death statute when it held otherwise under criminal and probate law.
Justice Glaze, joined by Justices Corbin and Roaf, dissented. At the
outset of his dissent, Justice Glaze pointed out that the majority of states
allow a cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus and that the
reasons provided in support of recovery were compelling.3 3 Furthermore,
'the willful killing of an unborn, quick child, by any injury to the mother of such child,
which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be adjudged
manslaughter.' . . . However, that manslaughter statute, specifically relating to unborn
children, was expressly repealed by Act 928 of 1975. Obviously, the legislative intent
shown, if any, is that the killing of a viable fetus is not manslaughter.' Id. (quoting
Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 111, 722 S.W.2d 584, 587 (1987)).
132. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 525, 910 S.W.2d at 219.
133. Id.
134. Id. Amendment 68 reads as follows: "The policy of Arkansas is to protect the life
of every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the Federal
Constitution." ARK. CONST. amend LXVIII.
135. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 525, 910 S.W.2d at 219. The court stated:
If we were to hold that Amendment 68 was a self-executing amendment requiring
us to interpret the wrongful death law as protecting fetuses in accordance with its
terms, we would have to draw the line not at birth or at viability but at
conception, and that is a position that has not been advanced by anyone to our
knowledge.
Id. Note that Rhode Island may be close to advancing such a position. In Presley v.
Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976), the court held that a fetus is a "person" within the
meaning of the wrongful death statute whether viable or nonviable. Presley, 365 A.2d at
754.
136. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 525, 910 S.W.2d at 219.
137. Id. The court stated, "[s]urely this decision will heighten the General Assembly's
awareness of the issue at hand, and we commend it to the legislative prerogative." Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting). Justice Glaze noted that at least thirty-one states allow
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he reasoned that the distinction between allowing a cause of action for
prenatal injuries to a child born alive, but not to a stillborn fetus, is
illogical.140
Moreover, Justice Glaze asserted that the Chatelain majority did not
properly consider the remedial nature of Arkansas's Wrongful Death
Statute. 4 ' He argued that Arkansas's statute is similar to North Dakota's
statute, yet North Dakota recognized the action.'42 Justice Glaze also
criticized the majority for delegating the issue to the General Assembly; he
contended that the General Assembly intended for courts to construe the
statute to effectuate its purposes and objectives.'4 3
Finally, Justice Glaze proposed that allowing the action would be
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade.144 He reasoned that, because Roe found viability to be the point at
the wrongful death statute should
which the state's legitimate interest began,
145
be interpreted to protect viable fetuses.
V. SIGNIFICANCE

In Chatelain, the Supreme Court of Arkansas decided an issue of first
impression in Arkansas tort law. By rejecting the proposition that a fetus
is a "person" under the wrongful death statute, the court foreclosed a
plaintiff's right to recover for the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus. This
decision is particularly significant in light of the progressive and modem
views favoring recovery. The majority of courts faced with similar facts and
the cause of action, while only nine deny the action. Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting).
140. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 526, 910 S.W.2d at 220 (Glaze, J., dissenting). "In my view,
it is logically indefensible and unjust to deny an action where the child is stillborn, yet permit
the action where the child survives birth but only for a short period of time." Id. (Glaze, J.,
dissenting) (citing Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985)).
141. Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 527, 910 S.W.2d at 220 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting). Justice Glaze stated:
The majority opinion permits this court to avoid its traditional judicial role, by
suggesting the General Assembly should address the issues raised here concerning
the state's wrongful death statute. Presumably, the General Assembly intended
that the courts would construe the statutes in a manner which would give effect
to the statute's purposes and objectives.
Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
145. Chatelain,322 Ark. at 527-28, 910 S.W.2d at 220-21 (Glaze J., dissenting). Justice
Glaze noted that the United States Supreme Court, in Roe, "found the compelling point in
the state's legitimate interest of protecting potential life to be at viability." Thus he argued
that "[a]pplying the rationale in Roe, the wrongful death statute should be construed to
include a viable fetus as a person entitled to protection." Id. (Glaze, J., dissenting).
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interpreting similar statutes
have held that a fetus is a "person" under
46
wrongful death statutes.
However, Chatelain'ssignificance extends beyond the denial of a cause
of action. The decision solidifies the legal status of a viable fetus under
Arkansas law. As the court noted, earlier decisions held that a fetus is not
a "decedent" under the probate code or a "person" under the manslaughter
statute. Thus, the court was unwilling to reach a contrary result in
Chatelain out of concern for creating inconsistent views of a fetus's legal
status.
In conclusion, it is important to note that three justices favored
allowing recovery under the statute. Thus, with a change in the composition
of the court, the court might reverse itself, if given the opportunity.
However, the Chatelain court strongly suggested that the Arkansas General
Assembly must expand the definition of "person" to specifically include a
fetus before an action would lie under the Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute.
Brenda Daugherty Snow

146. See supra note 44.

